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Abstract
This paper exploits a natural experiment created by a survey design to show that the quality
of income data systematically changes across waves of a panel. We estimate that the effect
of being interviewed for a second time, relative to the ﬁrst, is to increase mean monthly
income by 8%. Dependent interviewing – a recall device commonly used in panel surveys
– explains one third of the observed increase. The remaining share is attributed to changes
in respondent behaviour (panel conditioning). We review the evidence for and against a
reporting improvement vs. a behavioural response by survey participants.
I. Introduction
An extensive body of work in economics is underpinned by household survey data on
incomes.Recent examples include:Chetty et al. (2017) [Current PopulationSurvey (CPS)],
Hoynes, Schanzenbach and Almond (2016) (Panel Survey of Income Dynamics), Yang
(2017) (Survey of Income and Program Participation), and Blundell et al. (2016) (British
Household Panel Survey). Distinctly, smaller scale household panel surveys are regularly
used to analyse randomized trials and relevant income variables. Recent examples include:
Haushofer and Shapiro (2016), Banerjee et al. (2015) and Karlan and Zinman (2011).
Government statistics on the income distribution are commonly based on large household
surveys, for example, the ofﬁcial US poverty rate is based upon the CPS. Ofﬁcial income
statisticsmay also rely on panel data, where theymonitor changes in income over a lifetime.
Examples include ofﬁcial statistics of the European Union (European Union Income and
Living Conditions survey); and the UK Government (UK Household Longitudinal Study).
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This paper exploits a natural experiment created by a survey design to study how
measurement error in incomeevolveswith repeated interviewing in a panel survey. Previous
research has shown that state transfers and self-employment income are under-reported in
household surveys (Meyer and Sullivan, 2003, 2011; Lynn et al., 2012; Hurst, Li and
Pugsley, 2014; Meyer and Mittag, 2015; Brewer, Etheridge and O’Dea, 2017), but there
is little evidence on whether measurement error is on average stable across waves of a
panel.We ﬁnd that the quality of measured income systematically changes across the early
waves of a leading panel survey. If the changes represent reporting improvements, then this
suggests amajor beneﬁt of repeated interviewing. Irrespectively, estimates of distributional
change based on the early waves of the panel will confound true changes with data quality
changes and be biased.
Panel experiencemay affect a given respondent’s income report, for a given year, for two
reasons. First, panel conditioning (PC) effectsmay operatewhere panel participants change
their behaviour (reporting or economic) as a result of being part of the panel. PC improves
data quality if it reﬂects a respondents improved understanding of the questionnaire content
or a growing trust in the interviewer or data holders. PC reduces data quality if respondents
learn to strategically answer questions with the aim of reducing the interview length.
Related, the data will become unrepresentative if survey participation leads to changes in
real behaviour (Das and Leino, 2011; Zwane et al., 2011; Crossley et al., 2017; Bach and
Eckman, 2018). Second, dependent interviewing (DI) – a tool that survey respondents of
their reports at the previous interview – will lead to differences in data quality between the
baseline and subsequent interviews where it takes effect.
Few studies have examined the stability of measurement error in income across waves
of a panel. David and Bollinger (2005) ﬁnd that false negative reporting of US food
stamps is highly correlated across wave one and two of the Survey of Income and Pro-
gram Participation. Das, Toepoel and van Soest (2011) propose a methodology to quantify
PC effects. They compare responses of ﬁrst-time responders in refreshment samples to
responses from experienced panel members and make assumptions on attrition.1 In this
spirit, Halpern-Manners, Warren and Torche (2014) note that experienced panel members
in the US General Social Survey are less likely to refuse questions about their income.
Similarly, Frick et al. (2006) ﬁnd that experienced panel members report higher income in
the German Socio-Economic Panel. Nevertheless, despite the large interest of economists
in living standards, we know of no study that has performed a systematic analysis of how
measurement error in income and its components evolves across waves of a panel.
In this study, we provide evidence on the comparability of reported income across the
waves of a large general purpose panel survey: the UK Household Longitudinal Study
(UKHLS). Our approach is novel in that it exploits two features of the survey design to
estimate the causal effect of panel experience on reported income (and does not require data
linkage or refreshment samples). First, the ﬁeldwork period for adjacent waves overlaps
by one year. This generates a natural experiment in which randomly selected samples of
individuals are interviewed at different waves of the panel but in the same calendar year.
Second,UKHLSuses ‘reactive’DI.Thismeans that individuals are promptedwith previous
1
Taking this approach, Van Landeghem (2014) ﬁnds a drop in a stated utility measure across the ﬁrst-rounds of
interviews in two panel surveys.
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wave responses only after their initial response. Both their initial and ﬁnal responses are
recorded meaning that we can observe exactly which individuals would have failed to
report an income source in the absence of DI. This allows us to decompose observed data
quality changes into shares due to PC and to DI.
Our approach and data offer several further advantages over other studies exploring
measurement error in income data that have used small scale administrative data linkage
or refreshment samples (e.g. David and Bollinger, 2005; Lynn et al., 2012). First, the large
sample sizes available mean we can precisely estimate the effects of interest. Second, our
data are representative of the Great Britain population (and not subsamples such as the
poor or individuals covered by tax records) meaning that we can study how effects vary by
representative subgroups of interest such as pensioners, working age groups and families.
Third, our analysis covers a comprehensive set of income sources including earnings,
investment income, and a total of 39 unearned sources.This enables us to identify precisely
which income sources are most sensitive to prior panel participation.
Our main ﬁnding is that repeated interviewing changes the quality of income data (in
particular for pensions and state transfers) and this occurs across the initial waves of the
panel. A second interview, relative to the ﬁrst, increases reported gross monthly income
by £142 or 8% and about one third of the difference can be explained by DI, with the
other two thirds due to PC. As to whether survey participants changed their reporting or
economic behaviours, the evidence we present is inconclusive. However, it points to a
large share (83%) of the total PC effect representing a reporting improvement. Indeed, we
present evidence showing an upgrade in respondent conﬁdence in the conﬁdentiality of
their sensitive data and falls in income refusal rates following a ﬁrst interview. Separately,
we present evidence of similar effects in another leading panel survey (British Household
Panel Survey). More generally, the effects might be expected to extend to other sensitive
areas of data collection.
Importantly, the effects we identify have substantive consequences for analysis of the
income distribution.They lead to lower estimates of inequality and poverty but also income
mobility.
The paper proceeds as follows: the next section describes the data. Section III discusses
identiﬁcation and the results are shown in section IV. Section V explores the mechanisms
behind the results and sectionVI concludes.A supplementary appendix includes additional
materials.
II. Data
UKHLS data
This paper uses data from the UK Household Longitudinal Study (UKHLS) that began in
2009. UKHLS is a large general-purpose social survey. It replaces the former BHPS as
the data source for ofﬁcial UK Government statistics on poverty dynamics. We work with
the main ‘General Population Sample Great Britain’ sub-sample, which is representative
of the Great Britain household population at wave one.
The large UKHLS sample requires the ﬁeldwork for each wave to be spread over 24
months. Households selected to take part in the panel were randomly allocated across the
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24-month interviewperiod ofwave one.All adultmembers (aged 16 plus) of the households
are interviewed every 12 months. These two features imply an overlap of one year in the
ﬁeldwork period of consecutive waves. This overlap is an issue we exploit in identiﬁcation.
At wave one, interviews were conducted in 24,797 households with 41,586 individuals
receiving an interview. As with all household panel surveys, there is an initial drop-off in
individual response rates and 75.4% of wave one respondents completed an interview at
wave two with a further 1.9% completing a proxy interview.2
Income variables and dependent interviewing
UKHLS includes a detailed set of questions on income. These are collected for each
samplemember in a face-to-face interview that is conducted by computer-assisted personal
interviewing. A list of the income questions used in analysis is included in Appendix B.
Data collection of the income components occurs in different modules.An ‘employee’s’
module asks for gross (and net) pay at last payment and the usual pay if ‘last’ and ‘usual’
differed. A ‘self-employment’ module asks self-employees for their share of the proﬁt
or loss on their most recent accounts or, where not available, an estimate of their usual
monthly or weekly self-employment income. All respondents receive the ‘second jobs’
and ‘household ﬁnances’ modules. The ﬁrst asks about gross income from any second or
odd jobs. The second records the amount received in interest and dividends in the last 12
months. None of the above modules make use of DI.
An ‘unearned income and state beneﬁts’module does use DI. It ﬁrst asks respondents to
examine a list of 9 broad types of payment and indicate which they are currently receiving.
Respondents are then ﬁltered to lists of speciﬁc sources (up to 39) where they indicate
those that they receive.3 DI is used to check whether any sources not reported but reported
at wave t −1 are currently received. A ﬁnal stage asks for the amounts for each reported
source, the period it covered and whether the income was received solely or jointly.
One dimension of data quality is the extent to which respondents refuse to answer
a question. Figure 1 plots trends in refusal rates (refusing to provide an amount), for
respondents who completed a full-interview at each of waves one (2009–10) to ﬁve (2014–
15).4 The ﬁgure is consistent with improving data quality as the panel ages, as all the refusal
rates fall with the length of time the individuals have been in the panel. The biggest drop
in the refusal rate occurs for self-employment proﬁt which starts at 42.0% in wave 1 and
reaches a minimum over the ﬁve waves of 34.2% at wave 4. The drop-off in refusal rates is
notably sharper for all sources between waves 1 and waves 2. For example, refusal rates for
self-employment proﬁt fall from 42.0% to 37.1% and from 12.0% to 10.3% for earnings.5
2
Reinterview rates for comparable panels are: BHPS: 86.0 (1991); HILDA: 87.0 (2002); GSOEPA: 88.1 (1985);
GSOEP B: 81.0 (1985) and PSID: 92.7 (1969). The year each survey started is listed in parenthesis. Full details can
be found in Schoeni et al. (2013).
3
Respondents meeting certain criteria are automatically prompted with the speciﬁc beneﬁt showcards, e.g. those
of retirement age are shown the pensions showcard; the long-term sick are shown the ‘disability beneﬁts’ showcard.
4
Refusals are counted as ‘refusal’+ ‘don’t know’where a ‘don’t know’ could be a polite refusal.
5
The refusal rates for ‘unearned income and state beneﬁts’ are low. For example, refusal rates on the pension
showcard for our balanced sample are: 0.007, 0.003, 0.004, 0.003 and 0.004.
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Figure 1. Income refusal rates bywave
Notes: Sample of individuals responding at each of wave 1–5
In our analysis, we replace item missing values with the standard longitudinal imputes
of the data producers. There can be two other types of missing data: missing an individual
interview (unit non-response) and missing an individual interview but a proxy answers a
shorter questionnaire. The latter two are addressed in the methodology section.
Comparison to a cross-sectional gold standard
Beforemoving to ourmainmethod and results, we look for evidence of data quality changes
by comparing the UKHLS income distribution to that from a cross-sectional gold standard.
The gold standard we use is the ‘Households BelowAverage Income’ (HBAI) series, which
are the data source for ofﬁcial UK statistics on the income distribution. The HBAI data
sets are built from a mixture of survey data, from a specialist income survey (the Family
Resources Survey), and administrative tax records. The HBAI data undergoes extensive
editing and imputation, by the UK Department for Work and Pensions, which is based on
their access to administrative records and knowledge of the tax and beneﬁt system.6 As
the HBAI specializes in income measurement and incorporates administrative data and
UKHLS is a general purpose survey, HBAI can be considered as a ‘gold standard’.
Estimates of selected quantiles of the income distribution from the two sources are
shown in Figure 2. Focusing on the lower half of the distribution, whilst there is a clear
similarity between the estimates the difference between them diminishes across the early
waves of the panel.At wave 1 HBAI gives higher estimates of incomes for the 1st, 5th, 10th
and 25th percentiles but by wave 3 the differences have notably reduced (in fact UKHLS
gives slightly higher estimates by wave 3). Thereafter, the differences are small and stable.
As the UKHLS estimates gets closer to the HBAI ones across the early waves of the panel,
the ﬁgure is consistent with improvements in UKHLS data quality as the panel ages. The
6
The HBAI data-set includes income variables that have been adjusted to better measure top incomes. In order
that our data sources are comparable, we use the unadjusted HBAI variables.
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Figure 2. Selected quantiles of UKHLS/HBAI (2009/10–2013/14)
Notes: The HBAI corresponds to a ﬁnancial year (April to March) and a UKHLS wave to two calendar years.
To account for differences in the ﬁeldwork period of the two sources, we pool two consecutive HBAI data
sets when comparing to a single UKHLS wave. All ﬁgures are expressed in 2014–15 prices using the bespoke
monthly CPI price index used in the ofﬁcial UK income statistics and produced by the Ofﬁce for National
Statistics.
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top half of the panel shows the median, 75th, 95th and 99th percentiles. The estimates
line-up remarkably closely.
Separately, in the main results, we also compare estimates of income sub-components
to another gold-standard. We compare UKHLS estimates of beneﬁt receipt to known ad-
ministrative totals.
In the next section, we use a quasi-experiment induced by the design of UKHLS to
understand if PC and DI are responsible for the data quality changes observed above.
III. Methodology
We have two randomly allocated groups G=1, 2. At time t group 2 (the treatment group)
is in wave S(t) while group 1, which begins the survey one year later, is in wave S(t)−1.
Let R(S(t))=1 indicate that an individual remained in the survey (did not attrit) up to wave
S(t), and R(S(t))= 0 otherwise. Groups 1 and 2 are random samples of the population.
However, group 1 was selected one year later. If the age structure and other characteristics
of the population are stable, group 1 will be on average the same as group 2, except that
they will be one year younger at any t. Our strategy is to compare income reports of the
two groups at time t, conditional on R(S(t))=1 (in both groups) and age. So, for example,
in t =2010, group 2 is in wave 2 and group 1 in wave 1. We compare the income reports
of group 2 respondents of a given age to the wave 1 income reports of those group 1
respondents who are of the same age, and who also responded to wave 2 (in 2011).
In our example, this comparison is as follows:
E
[
y2igt|t=2010,g=2,R(S =2)=1,A
]−E [y1igt|t=2010,g=1,R(S =2)=1,A
]
(1)
where y2igt and y1igt denote reported income at a second and ﬁrst interview, respectively,
and A denotes age. Note that this is equal to:
E
[
y2igt|t=2010,g=2,R(S =2)=1,A
]−E [y1igt|t=2010,g=2,R(S =2)=1,A
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
casual effect
+E [y1igt|t=2010,g=2,R(S =2)=1,A
]−E [y1igt|t=2010,g=1,R(S =2)=1,A
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
selection bias
(2)
The initial random selection of groups 1 and 2 from the population should ensure that the
second term is zero at each age. Threats to the internal validity of our design are as follows.
First, as in any random experiment, it could be that the randomization was not implemented
correctly. Second, if the macroeconomy affects the opportunity cost of people joining the
survey, there could be compositional differences between the groups as they joined the
panel one year a part. Third, it is possible that the process of panel attrition was different
for group 1 and group 2, so that conditioning on R(S =2)=1 is differentially selective in
the two groups. This could happen, for example, because group 1 started a year later, when
the survey ﬁeld work agency had acquired additional experience.
We address these possibilities, in the usual way, by checking for covariate balance
across the two groups. We also performed further checks on the compositional stability
© 2019 The Authors. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics published by Oxford University and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
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of people joining the panel and on whether attrition was differentially selective across the
two groups. Further details are given below.
We implement equation (1), for a given t, through linear regression. The estimating
equation is:
Yi =+I (g=2)i +age′i+ i (3)
where Yi is reported income of individual i (earnings, beneﬁts and unearned income, or
investment income), I (g=2)i an indicator variable taking the value 1 for a group 2 respon-
dent, agei a vector of 1×1 age dummies and i an error termwithE[i|I (g=2)i,agei]=0.
is the causal effect of interest.As covariates are balanced across our groups, including con-
trols in the model is unnecessary, but we nevertheless include them to improve precision.7
We also estimatedmodelswithout controls (AppendixA1) and the estimates line-up closely
with our main results. We report standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity.8
To estimate the reporting effect net of DI, we set to zero any income source for which
an individual received a DI reminder and then re-estimate our main coefﬁcient of interest.
This works as the DI reminders were triggered only after a respondent did not report a
source they received at the previous wave.
Checks on internal validity conﬁrmed covariate balance at wave one.9 Full results are
included in Table A1, Appendix A.
We also performed three checks on the stability with which respondents joined the
panel. First, we conﬁrmed that the share of people agreeing to take part in the survey
did not systematically differ by calendar year (see Figure A1). Second, a balance check
conﬁrmed that respondents that joined the panel in 2009 were observationally similar to
those joining in 2010 (see Table A2).10 Third, our main ﬁndings are robust to dropping
months from the sample that showed differences in the joining rate across the calendar
years of wave one (see Figure A13).
A further check on attrition conﬁrmed that it is unrelated to the initial group allocation.
The check involved estimating an attrition model including a wide range of controls and
checking the signiﬁcance of their interactionwith a dummy for being in the treated group.11
None of the interaction terms was statistically signiﬁcant and neither were they jointly
signiﬁcant.12
7
Given that the control variables are potentially also subject to PC,we focus on controls with low item non-response
rates and that we judge are unlikely to be sensitive areas of questioning. The full list controls is given in the footnote
to Figure 3.
8
We also tried clustering standard errors at the level of the Primary Sampling Unit but it made little difference to
the estimated standard errors.
9
The samples were balanced in terms of sex; age; education; marital status; and health; small but statistically
signiﬁcant differences were observed for: the share Indian or Chinese (0.5 percentage points) but not for other ethnic
groups; living in social housing (1.6 percentage points) although not for those renting, with a mortgage or owning
their home; and the number of people in the household (0.04 of a person).
10
Small but statistically signiﬁcant differences were observed for the share White (0.9 percentage points), Indian
or Chinese (0.5 percentage points) and living in social housing (1.2 percentage points).
11
The controls are: sex, age, ethnicity, education, relationship status, economic status, health, housing tenure,
household size, number of children.
12
The F-stat = 1.10, P = 0.33, critical value = 1.65.
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IV. Results
Differences in reporting between waves 1 and 2
Figure 3 presents estimates of  from equation (3). The ﬁgure shows results from models
estimated separately for total: income; beneﬁts and unearned income (social security ben-
eﬁts; pensions; and other unearned income); earnings; and investment income. For details
of the main pension types and social security beneﬁts see Table 1.
The causal effect of being interviewed for a second time, relative to a ﬁrst, is to increase
totalmonthly incomeby £141.71 or 8%.The effect is driven solely by changes in the beneﬁts
and unearned income sub-component of income. In particular, the strongest effects occur
for social security beneﬁts and pensions [£24.85 (10.9%) and £81.24 (28.2%)]. These
numbers imply substantial differences in the quality of reported data across the ﬁrst two
waves of the panel. Failure to account for this survey effect would give a highly misleading
picture of population income changes over the period.
Figure 4 examines the extent to which the survey effects are due to PC. It presents
results from re-estimating equation (3) but setting a reported wave 2 amount to zero where
a DI prompt was triggered. The estimates have fallen in size but surprisingly they remain
large and statistically signiﬁcant. For example, the PC effect on total income is to increase
reporting by 5.5%. Overall the results show that a large share of the reporting changes seen
at the second interview is due to PC and not DI.
Given the potential importance of these results for the measurement of poverty and
inequality, it is important to establish whether the survey effects are constant across the
Figure 3. Effect of second interview on reported income
Notes: The point estimates presented correspond to  from equation (3) with the full-set of controls. Means
from the baseline (wave 1) interview are reported in square brackets. Conﬁdence intervals are calculated using
robust standard errors. The controls are dummy variables for (number of categories in parenthesis): sex, age
in one year bands, ethnicity (6), highest qualiﬁcation (6), retired, student, relationship status (5), housing type
(4), long-standing illness, household size (16), number of children (11), region (12) and interview month (12).
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TABLE 1
Effect of wave 2 interview on reporting of selected unearned sources
Receipt Amount
DI+PC PC DI+PC PC
Pensions
State pension† [23.62, £528.24 ] 1.327*** 0.477* 6.289 6.696
(0.204) (0.214) (4.091) (4.127)
Private pension [5.00, £455.50 ] 1.932*** 0.883*** 90.497 109.403
(0.264) (0.255) (61.799) (70.711)
Employer pension [14.84, £822.87 ] 1.497*** 0.381 279.624* 274.081*
(0.337) (0.335) (121.585) (126.274)
Spouse employer pension [2.76, £649.47 ] 0.666*** 0.316 −2.274 36.725
(0.175) (0.171) (221.224) (238.808)
Social security beneﬁts:
Family beneﬁts
Working Tax Credit [6.33, £254.43 ] 1.154*** 0.598* −0.105 −3.016
(0.278) (0.274) (8.499) (8.616)
Child beneﬁt [24.04, £145.75 ] 0.535 0.078 −0.563 −0.664
(0.312) (0.312) (1.020) (1.014)
Child tax credit [17.68, £297.48] 1.108*** 0.295 −3.796 −2.424
(0.337) (0.336) (5.870) (5.921)
Disability beneﬁts
Incapacity beneﬁt [2.71, £409.44 ] 0.805*** 0.453* 5.199 3.205
(0.193) (0.188) (10.554) (10.786)
Disability living allowance [4.96, £305.65] 1.497*** 0.853*** −12.521 −16.577
(0.256) (0.249) (8.455) (8.539)
Low income beneﬁts
Income support [4.81, £355.62 ] 0.334 0.078 −1.840 −1.548
(0.231) (0.228) (12.003) (12.167)
Housing beneﬁt [10.57, £372.02 ] 1.058*** −0.119 −4.354 −3.370
(0.288) (0.286) (6.238) (6.455)
Council tax beneﬁt [12.10, £101.06 ] 1.969*** 0.356 3.173 2.424
(0.332) (0.327) (4.542) (4.720)
N = 29,528
Notes: see Figure 3 notes. Sample means for g=1 are reported in square brackets.
†The state pension is a part contribution based beneﬁt. It is paid from age 65 for men. For women, it is in the process
of being increased from 60 to 65.
Signiﬁcance levels indicated as *P<0.05, ***P<0.001.
distribution of income. We extended the above analysis by estimating quantile regression
models (9 quantiles) for total income and its logarithm. To summarize the results, the level
effects are fairly constant across the distribution but the log effects are large for those at
the bottom. For example, quantiles 0.1 and 0.7 see similar increases in reported income
(around £90 per month), but this amounts to a substantial 17% increase for quantile 0.1 but
only 4% for quantile 0.7. Full ﬁgures of results are provided in the supplementary materials
(Figures A2 and A3). We explore in detail the effects of the survey effects on inequality
measurement in a separate subsection below.
We also explored the possibility of heterogenous treatment effects by estimating mod-
els for subsamples of: pensioners, working age with children and working age without
© 2019 The Authors. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics published by Oxford University and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
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Figure 4. Panel Conditioning effect of second interview on reported income
Notes: see Figure 3 notes.
children.13 In the interests of space, we only brieﬂy review the results here. The effects are
strongest for the pensioner subsample and are concentrated in the ‘beneﬁts and unearned
income’ component of income. The wave 2 effect is to increase reporting of this category
by a large 24.1%. Moreover, 73.8% of this reported increase is due to PC and not DI. For
the ‘working age without children’ subsample, the effects are weaker in absolute value
but are proportionally large. Beneﬁts and unearned income increase by 35.9% of the wave
1 mean and 57.5% is due to PC and not DI. Finally, for the ‘working age with children’
subsample, the effects are smaller and statistically signiﬁcant only for the total effect in
‘beneﬁts and unearned income’ (7.4% of the wave 1 mean). The interested reader can ﬁnd
the full set of results in Figures A4–A9, Appendix A.
We also explored the extent to which imputation can reduce the data quality differences
across waves. Details are provided in section A.2 of Appendix A.
An important question iswhether the effects presented for beneﬁts and unearned income
are due to changes in reported receipt or the amounts. Table 1 explores this matter by
presenting estimates of equation (3) separately for 12 of the most widely received pensions
and social security beneﬁts in the data. Columns 1 and 2 refer to receipt, and 3 and 4 to
the (conditional) amounts. The odd columns show the total effect (PC+DI), and the even
the PC effects only.
13
We deﬁne ‘pensioners’ as those of UK state pension age (60 for women and 65 for men) and ‘Working age’ those
below it.
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Figure 5. Reporting differences at later waves
Notes: For a list of control variables, see the notes to Figure 3. Analysis samples correspond: to 2010 (wave
1–2), 2011 (wave 2–3), 2012 (wave 3–4) and 2013 (wave 4–5) and are restricted to respondents who had a full
interview at both corresponding waves.
The effect of being interviewed for a second time is to increase the reported receipt
of each of the 12 sources in the table. The effects are statistically signiﬁcant (excluding
income support) and the magnitudes are non-trivial. For example, the effect on the state
pension14 is 1.33 percentage points or 5.6% of the wave 1 mean. Column (2) shows that
much of the increases are attributable to PC (statistically signiﬁcant PC effects are seen
for both disability beneﬁts, two types of pension, and Working Tax Credit). For example,
PC increased state pension receipt by nearly 0.4 percentage points or 2.0% of the wave 1
mean.15 We ﬁnd no evidence of changes in the (conditional) amounts in columns 3. 11/12
of the estimated coefﬁcients are statistically insigniﬁcant. Column 4 conﬁrms this ﬁnding
when estimating the PC effect only.16
To look for survey effects at later interviews, we re-estimate equation (2) for different
t [t = 2010 (waves 1 and 2); t = 2011 (waves 2 and 3), t = 2012 (waves 3 and 4) and
t=2013 (waves 4 and 5)]. Figure 5 presents the results.After t=2010, the estimated effect
is always small and statistically insigniﬁcant. Therefore, the biggest change in behaviour
(reporting or economic) occurs between the ﬁrst and second waves of the panel and not
at later waves. A comparison of income quantiles by wave and group conﬁrmed that the
effects are conﬁned to the early waves of the panel (Appendix A3).
In the next two subsections, we ask if the survey effects documented here (i) might
generalize to other surveys and (ii) whether they havemeaningful economic consequences.
14
See Table 1 notes.
15
The conditional pension amounts are the largest in the table. This explains why even small differences in the
reporting of pension receipt can have sizable effects on the income distribution.
16
Our results are in contrast to David and Bollinger (2005) who found that false negative reporting of food stamp
receipt in the US Survey of Income and Program Participation was stable across waves. A lack of statistical power in
their study could plausibly explain the difference.
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Evidence from the British Household Panel Survey
It is important to knowwhether the pattern established above is a peculiarity of UKHLS or a
more general feature of income data collection.We turn to the predecessor of UKHLS – the
British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) – that added refreshment samples to the original
(1991) sample in 1999 and 2000. We can therefore compare ﬁrst-time responders in the
refreshment samples to experienced panel members and see how differences in income
change across waves. DI was not introduced in BHPS until 2006 and so our results relate
to the effects of PC only.
Figure 6 plots selected income quantiles for a sample of respondents interviewed in
each of waves 9–13 of the BHPS and living in Scotland or Wales, separately by whether
they form part of the refreshment sample or were an original sample member. At wave 9,
we observe that the refreshment sample gives lower values of percentiles 1, 5, 10 and 25
but that the differences notably decrease at wave 10. Thereafter, the gaps remain relatively
stable.
We ﬁnd similar reporting changes for the Northern Ireland refreshment sample. For
percentiles 1 and 5, we again observe that, relative to the original sample, the refreshment
sample provides lower estimates in wave 11 but by an amount that noticeably decreases
at wave 12. Thereafter, the gap between the two estimates is relatively stable. For higher
quantiles, there was no obvious reporting change in either of the refreshment samples. We
also compared trends in BHPS and UKHLS item non-response rates. Both panels show
the same pattern of falling refusal rates, the longer the respondents are in the panel. Full
details are included in Appendix A4.
Figure 6. BHPS Scotland and Wales refreshment samples (wave 9)
Notes: Sample of respondents interviewed in each of waves 9–13. Original sample members are restricted to
living in Scotland or Wales. Scotland and Wales refreshment samples entered at wave 9.
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Implications for inequality and mobility estimates
This section explores the consequences of the survey effects for one important economic
analysis: inequality and poverty measurement. Analysis of inequality and poverty is typi-
cally based on net income rather than gross income. The following is therefore based on
the UKHLS-derived household net income variable. The variable has been produced by
the UKHLS data providers, has been considered reliable and aims to replicate the ofﬁcial
HBAI measure.
Figure 7 compares the distribution in the gold standard and each of the treated and
control groups by means of a pair of quantile–quantile plots. The control group (ﬁrst-
time reporters) has lower income relative to the gold standard. The missing income is
concentrated at the bottom of the distribution and steadily decreases across the distribution.
Conversely the treated group (second-time reporters) has a distribution that matches very
closely indeed to the gold standard.
The ﬁrst three columns of Table 2 show 2010 estimates of seven inequality measures
for our treated and control groups. The measures are commonly used in inequality analysis
and are as follows: the Gini coefﬁcient, Standard deviation of logs, Atkinson index with
aversion parameter 2, percentile ratios (90–10, 90–50, 10–50) and the share below the
poverty line. Each captures inequality at different parts of the distribution. For example,
the Gini is sensitive to changes in the centre of the distribution, whereas, the Aitkinson
measure is sensitive to changes in the tails. Columns 1 and 2 show the estimates for the
control and treated group, respectively, while column 3 shows the difference.
We observe statistically signiﬁcant differences for ﬁve of the inequality measures (stan-
dard deviation of logs, percentile ratios and the share below the poverty line). Overall, the
effect of treatment is to compress the income distribution, relative to the control. We see
that treatment reduces the standard deviation of the logs, two of the percentile ratios and
the share below the poverty line. However, the 90–50 ratio increases showing the median
rising relative to the mean. Overall, the results show that the survey effects documented
in the previous sections lead to meaningful differences in cross-sectional estimates of
inequality.
Are the differences in inequality consistent with higher data quality for the treated
group?To explore this, we compare our treatment and control group estimates of inequality
to those from a gold standard (HBAI). We should expect the estimates of higher quality
Figure 7. Quantile–quantile plot of the Gold Standard vs. Treated and Control
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TABLE 3
The effect of reporting changes on mobility estimates
Control (g=1) Treated (g=2) Difference
Transitions (between 2010 and 2011)
Exit poverty (share) 0.483 0.427 −0.056***
(0.015)
Enter poverty (share) 0.076 0.083 0.007
(0.004)
Mean income change (£ per week) 5.441 −29.680 −35.121**
(12.112)
Mean income change (log) 0.034 −0.004 −0.038***
(0.007)
Changed decile (share) 0.654 0.642 −0.012
(0.006)
Observations 11,823 12,350
Note: See Table 2 notes.
to more closely match the HBAI ones. The table conﬁrms that when there are signiﬁcant
differences between the estimates from our treatment and control groups, it is the treated
group who is closer to the gold standard estimates (column 4). The observed reporting
increases of the previous sections are therefore consistent with reporting improvements.17
We also compared estimates of distributional change between 2010 and 2011 (columns
5–8). The treated group is being measured for the second and third time, while the control
for the ﬁrst and second time. We ﬁnd that the survey effects have notable consequences
for the measures of change. We ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant differences in estimates of
change for 5 out of 7 of the inequality measures. As we expect, it is the control group
that overestimates distributional change. For example, the change in the 90–10 ratio is
estimated to be over 11 times larger for the control group compared to the treated group.
Moreover, when a statistically signiﬁcant difference occurs, it is the treated group who is
now closer to the gold-standard estimate (column 8).
Finally, we ask whether the observed survey effects lead to bias in estimates of income
mobility. This is important as while inequality can be monitored using repeated cross-
sections, estimates of mobility require repeated measurement. Table 3 explores this by
comparing estimates of incomemobility between 2010 and 2011 for the treated and control
groups.We ﬁnd that the treated group had lower exit rates from poverty and lower changes
in income (both in levels and in logs) but not in poverty entry rates or in the share that
changed income decile. The magnitudes are non-trivial. For example, the treated group
shows an exit rate from poverty of 5.6 percentage points (11.59%) below the control
group. Put together, this section has shown that our ﬁndings from the previous sections
have substantive consequences for an important type of economic analysis.
To conﬁrm the robustness of our results, we performed a placebo check for the t=2012
year. As reporting changes were conﬁned to the start of the panel, we would not expect to
17
The Atkinson measure can be sensitive to extreme values in the lower tail of the distribution (see Cowell and
Flachaire, 2007). However, when we drop the top and bottom 1% of the sample, the Atkinson estimates line up very
closely to the gold standard (see Table A5).
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ﬁnd signiﬁcant inequality and mobility differences for this placebo check. Results support
this and are provided in Appendix Tables A7 and A8.
V. Explaining the panel conditioning effect
This section discusses the potential mechanisms through which PC operates. It ﬁrst con-
siders whether the observed effects reﬂect a reporting change or an economic change. It
reviews the existing literature and summarizes the empirical evidence for and against each.
Overall, the evidence is inconclusive. However, it does indicate that a substantial share of
the main ﬁndings (for pensions) arises through a reporting effect. The latter subsections
then present evidence as to why this might have occurred.
Changes in reporting or in take-up behaviour?
Zwane et al. (2011) andDas andLeino (2011) ﬁnd survey participation increases the uptake
of a health insurance in a developing country setting. Related, Bach and Eckman (2018)
ﬁnd that repeated interviewing increases participation in Active Labour Market Programs
in Germany (job application training, continuing education courses). In contrast to the
present paper, they ﬁnd that each additional exposure to the treatment, i.e. each additional
wave, intensiﬁes this effect. Could a similar change in take-up behaviour explain our PC
effects for ‘Beneﬁts and Unearned Income’?
We begin by comparing survey estimates of beneﬁt receipt to known administrative
totals. If our main results correspond to reporting improvements, then we expect survey
estimates for wave two to be closer to the known totals relative to the wave one estimates.
On the other hand, with a behavioural response we might expect survey respondents to
have a higher take-up rate than the population at large.TableA4 ofAppendixA presents the
comparison.Thewave two estimates of beneﬁt receipt are generally closer to known admin-
istrative totals, relative to thewave one estimates.Moreover, the survey never overestimates
beneﬁt receipt relative to the administrative sources. This provides at least suggestive, but
far from conclusive, evidence in favour of a reporting effect.
Distinctly, one indicator of reporting quality is the extent to which survey participants
refuse to answer questions about income. Figure 1 showed clear evidence of reporting
improvements, as the longer participants were in the panel, the lower were refusal rates.
Indeed, as with the main results of the paper, the most dramatic changes in refusal rates
occurred between waves one and two. Also, suggestive of data quality improvements was
the analysis in section II that showed that the survey estimates of inequality were closer to
a gold standard at wave 2 relative to wave 1.
Eighty three per cent of our PC effect occurs in pensions (Figure 4) and is concentrated
on the extensive margin (column 2, Table 1). In particular, our pensions category consists
of: state pensions; private pensions; and employer pensions (Table 1). If take-up of pensions
is already high; then it would rule out a behavioural response in take-up explaining our
pension ﬁndings.An ofﬁcial parliamentary report indicates that take-up of the state pension
‘is close to 100%’ (HC, 2005).18 Employer and private pensions could potentially go
18
All eligible citizens automatically receive a letter from the relevant Government department four months before
retirement.
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unclaimed, but there are no ofﬁcial estimates of this number. In principle, it should be rare
as the schemes are regulated by public bodies (The Pensions Regulator and The Financial
Conduct Authority).19 For example, trustees of workplace pensions are legally required to
take regular steps to trace missing members.20 Put together, it seems unlikely that increases
in take-up could be of sufﬁcient magnitude to explain our main pension results (ie. our
effect (in percentage terms) in Table 1 would require that take-up of state pensions be no
more than 74%, private pensions no more than 69% and employer pensions no more than
80%).
The remaining 17% of our PC effect occurred in ‘social security beneﬁts’ and in ‘Other
Unearned’ income (Figure 4). In particular, Table 1 showed signiﬁcant PC effects on the
extensive (and not intensive) margin of one means tested beneﬁt (Working Tax Credit)
and two disability beneﬁts (Incapacity Beneﬁt and Disability Living Allowance). On the
one hand, these differ from the health insurance considered in Das and Leino (2011)
where a health insurance was newly introduced and knowledge amongst the population
was imperfect.A take-up effect would also be inconsistent with themechanism proposed in
Zwane et al. (2011) where the survey acts to draw attention away from ‘immediate needs’
and towards ‘future contingencies’. On the other hand, unlike pensions, the non-take up
of means tested beneﬁts is a well documented problem (DWP, 2017). For Working Tax
Credit in 2010–11, the take-up rate was 64% (HMRC, 2012).The take-up rate for disability
beneﬁts is harder to estimate because of the difﬁculty in deﬁning the eligible population, but
they share similar features with means tested beneﬁts, where the most recent rates range
from 56% to 84% (DWP, 2017). Moreover, an increase in the uptake of a Government
programme following survey participation would be consistent with Bach and Eckman
(2018).21
Put together, it looks likely that 83% of the PC effects (pensions) cannot be driven
by a behavioural response in take-up, rather they are consistent with a change in the
reporting behaviour of survey participants. However, we cannot make the same claim for
the remaining 17% where increases in take-up would also be consistent with our ﬁndings.
Implementer learning
Here, we consider a possible explanation for the improved pension reporting documented
above: implementer learning. Implementers (ﬁeldwork agency, interviewers) accrue ex-
perience over the ﬁrst wave of the panel, raising the possibility that they are better able
to elicit responses at the wave 2 interviews. For implementer learning to be a convinc-
ing explanation, two conditions need to be met, and we consider both to be implausible.
First, implementers must beneﬁt from their experience at wave 2 2010 but not at wave
1 2010, even though the two were being collected at the same point in time.22 Second, im-
19
See ‘legal background’ here: http://www.thepensionsregulator.gov.uk/guidance/guidance-record-keeping.aspx.
20
For a recent freedom of information request on the subject see: http://www.thepensionsregulator.gov.uk/
foi/percentage-of-people-who-do-not-take-up-their-pensions-march-2017.aspx.
21
We found no evidence that the headline effect was stronger for low-income households (FiguresA2–A3), which
might be the case if there was an ‘information friction’ for low income respondents.
22
We show that there are few differences in the 2010 wave 1 and 2 interviewer experience distributions (TableA9,
Appendix A).
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TABLE 4
Comparison of UK Household Longitudinal Study (UKHLS) wave 1 to Households Below Average Income
(HBAI) by calendar year
Percentile UKHLS UKHLS
HBAI Wave 1 Ratio HBAI Wave 1 Ratio Ratio of ratios
2009 2009 (col 2/col 3) 2010 2010 (col 5/col 6) (col 7/col 4)
5 199.14 161.00 1.24 194.54 152.16 1.28 1.03
10 264.05 237.21 1.11 259.56 230.77 1.12 1.01
15 317.08 297.02 1.07 309.95 286.26 1.08 1.01
20 365.61 355.30 1.03 358.02 339.49 1.05 1.02
25 412.32 411.89 1.00 404.49 395.35 1.02 1.02
30 463.11 466.50 0.99 457.18 455.04 1.00 1.01
35 518.96 530.16 0.98 513.14 509.83 1.01 1.03
40 578.80 593.04 0.98 568.75 572.68 0.99 1.02
45 644.98 654.25 0.99 627.74 634.09 0.99 1.00
50 710.95 721.08 0.99 694.89 699.68 0.99 1.01
55 779.18 794.58 0.98 761.77 779.61 0.98 1.00
60 854.60 876.58 0.97 838.50 846.41 0.99 1.02
65 942.85 961.07 0.98 920.23 933.10 0.99 1.01
70 1,034.04 1,057.79 0.98 1,008.65 1,023.25 0.99 1.01
75 1,142.53 1,172.90 0.97 1,112.50 1,144.67 0.97 1.00
80 1,273.40 1,313.70 0.97 1,236.48 1,274.61 0.97 1.00
85 1,451.13 1,487.80 0.98 1,409.49 1,453.66 0.97 0.99
90 1,702.50 1,745.69 0.98 1,666.63 1,726.21 0.97 0.99
95 2,259.56 2,193.66 1.03 2,138.24 2,170.68 0.99 0.96
Notes: Analysis is based on the ‘HBAI’ data sets and for household gross income before deductions. HBAI
corresponds to a ﬁnancial year (April to April) and to UKHLS a full calendar year.
plementer learning would have to occur beyond the ﬁrst full year of data collection (when
the biggest learning might be expected) as the ﬁeldwork agency already had a full year of
ﬁeld experience (wave 1 2009) before the period of our analysis sample.
We compare estimates of the income distribution from UKHLS wave 1 (2009 respon-
dents) with the HBAI 2009; and UKHLS wave 1 (2010 respondents) with the HBAI 2010.
By 2010, UKHLS implementers had a full-year of experience, but the 2009 and 2010
(wave 1) respondents were new to the survey. If the problem is with implementers, rather
than respondents, then the 2010 comparison should be more favourable. It should be noted
that<100%ofwave 1 2010 interviewers participated at wave 1 2009. However, on average,
they were still substantially more experienced in terms of having participated in the survey
before (76.5% of wave 1 2010 interviewers participated at wave 1 2009).
Table 4 shows the results from this comparison. Columns 2 and 3 show estimated 2009
percentiles from the HBAI and UKHLS, respectively, and column 4 shows their ratio,
where a ratio > 1 indicates that UKHLS underestimates a percentile relative to HBAI.
Columns 5–7 repeat the analysis but for the 2010 (wave 1) calendar year.
The 2009 UKHLS percentiles match closely with the HBAI ones (column 2). UKHLS
misses income at the bottom of the distribution and most notably for percentiles 5, 10 and
15 where the ratios are 1.24, 1.11 and 1.07, respectively. A remarkably similar pattern is
seen for the 2010 (wave 1) calendar year. Column 8 presents the ratio of ratios and it is
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always close to one indicating little change in the relative difference between the surveys
over the period. It reaches an absolute maximum of 1.03 for the ﬁfth percentile, which if
anything, suggests that the coverage of UKHLS got worse relative to HBAI in the second
year of wave one compared to the ﬁrst year of wave one. We conclude that implementer
learning is unlikely to be responsible for the observed improvements in data quality.23
Respondent-interviewer rapport
Respondents and interviewers may establish a rapport during their ﬁrst interview, which
may result inmore accurate reporting at the second.We test for this possibility by estimating
the effect of having different interviewers at wave one and two, on a respondents wave 2
income report.
We augmented our main regression speciﬁcation with a dummy variable for having
different interviewers at wave one and two, and its interaction with the wave 2 dummy
(difference-in-difference model). The ‘different interviewer’ dummy captures time invari-
ant differences between respondents that changed interviewer or not and the coefﬁcient
on the interaction term gives the estimated causal effect of having a different interviewer
on wave 2 reported income. Both the ‘different interviewer’ dummy and its interaction
were highly insigniﬁcant (full results are included in Table A10). This indicates that the
rapport interviewers and respondents may have built during the ﬁrst interviewer played
no role in increasing the reporting of income at the second interview. We conclude that
the respondent-interviewer rapport cannot explain the observed reporting changes across
waves.
A distinct but related possibility is that interviewerswere non-randomly allocated across
the treated and control group and this generated differences in income reporting.We do not
have information on how the ﬁeld-work agency allocated interviewers across the months
of wave 1 but a balance check on some basic interviewer characteristics (sex, year of birth,
year started as interviewer, ethnicity) revealed only small and statistically insigniﬁcant
differences between the treated and control group (Table A12).
Respondent learning
Respondents may have an improved comprehension of the complex interview or have up-
dated their beliefs about the trustworthiness of the data holders following a ﬁrst interview.
On the ﬁrst, we exploit interviewer reports of howwell the respondent understood the ques-
tions during the interview (on a 5 point scale). On the second, we make use of interviewer
reports on whether a respondent was ‘suspicious’ about the study after the interview (3
point scale) and whether prior to the interview, the household respondent had questions
about ‘conﬁdentiality’ (binary variable).We estimate equation (3) for the three interviewer
outcomes. We recoded them into binary indicators for ease of interpretation and as some
of the categories contain few observations. Full details of the questions, distributions and
the construction of the interviewer observation variables are provided in Appendix B6.
23
These results are also inconsistent with different refusal rates in different years of wave one as a source of the
main ﬁndings of the paper.
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TABLE 5
Effect of wave 2 interview on respondent behaviours
(1) (2) (3)
Misunderstood questions Suspicious Queries conﬁdentiality
Wave 2 −0.01 −0.09*** −0.16***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
N 29,502 29,502 29,365
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
*P<0.05, **P<0.01, ***P<0.001.
Estimates of equation (1) with full set of controls (see Figure 3 notes).
Means of the dependent variables are: 0.31, 0.12, 0.18, respectively.
Table 5 shows the results.We ﬁnd no evidence that being interviewed for a second time
improved respondent understanding of the interview with the effects being small and sta-
tistically insigniﬁcant. In contrast, we observe that interviewers rated respondents as being
less suspicious after the second interview and were also less likely to have conﬁdentiality
queries.24 We also prepared analogous results where we recoded the interviewer reports
into a series of binary variables to assess whether the effect is monotonic. We never found
evidence of improvements in respondent understanding of the interview (Table A13). We
did ﬁnd that the treatment reduced the probability of the respondent being rated in the most
‘suspicious’ category. The effect size for the later was smaller compared to Table 5 (−0.01
vs. −0.09 above). Full results and included in Table A14.
An interpretation of these ﬁndings is that the ﬁrst interview reveals information to
respondents about the trustworthiness of the data holders. At the start of the panel, respon-
dents have doubts about the survey organization – a stranger to them – who may share
their sensitive data with third party organizations. But respondents learn from their ﬁrst
interview that the data holders are reliable and that their data does not get shared. By the
second interview, respondents have updated their beliefs about the trustworthiness of the
survey organisation, and are so more open in revealing details of their personal ﬁnances.25
One of our ﬁndings was of PC effects for pensions, including the state pension. This
raises the question of why state pension reporting is affected by PC – when on the face
of it, it is not a conﬁdential area of questioning. One explanation is that details of state
pension receipt are collected alongside more sensitive pension types (e.g. private pensions)
as part of a single pensions question. It may be that respondents unwilling to disclose their
sensitive pension types simply choose not to engage with the pensions question at all.
VI. Conclusions
We ﬁnd that the quality of income data collected as part of a large-scale household panel
survey changes over the life-time of the panel. The largest changes in reported income are
24
Table A11 shows that conﬁdentiality concerns are predictors of item non-response in the wave 1 cross-section.
25
The respondent learning interpretation can be reconciled with the use of the HBAI (based on survey data) as a
gold standard. For example, the extensive editing that the HBAI undergoes could act as a substitute for respondent
learning.
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concentrated across theﬁrstwaves of the panel and in unearned income sources, particularly
pensions and disability beneﬁts. The effect sizes are large and have until this point gone
unnoticed, possibly as it is difﬁcult to distinguish survey effects from real changes in living
standards, without linked administrative records. The novelty of our approach is that it
does not require data linkage, but makes use of unique features of the survey design of the
Understanding Society survey as a quasi-experiment.
The use of income data from repeated survey measures is commonplace in economics,
including the use of large scale household surveys and purpose built surveys implemented
as part of ﬁeld experiments. Our results indicate that researchers analysing data from the
early waves of a panel or with short panels (such as in randomized control trials) should
proceed with caution. One possibility is that researchers may want to consider adjusting
data from the ﬁrst waves of data collection.
We present evidence that at least some, but not all, of the effect we identify, is driven by a
reporting improvement.We show that falls in item-non-response and higher income reports
coincide with improving respondent conﬁdence in the conﬁdentiality of their sensitive
data. This also makes our ﬁndings relevant to studies based on cross-sectional data – which
essentially forms wave one of a panel – as they indicative the types of income sources that
may be under-reported.
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